Clientelism and Violence in Subnational Latin American and Caribbean Politics
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On December 13–14, Carleton University hosted a workshop on "Clientelism and Violence in Subnational Latin American and Caribbean Politics." The meeting was co-sponsored by Concordia University, Université de Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Carleton University, and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). The workshop program is attached. This report covers the main themes that emerged from the presentations and discussions.

Opening Remarks
Tina Hilgers underscored the reasons that have been advanced to explain the pervasiveness of the phenomenon of violence. These include a culture of acceptance, the wide proliferation of criminal organizations attracting youth, the increased levels of local autonomy that have provided resources for criminal and paramilitary factions and the state's incapacity to contain violence due to changing policy directions and institution building. Hilgers also underscored the centrality of clientelist networks in perpetuating violence. Perpetrators of violence have become socially and politically embedded in these exchange mechanisms. A number of policy alternatives have been suggested, such as judicial and police reforms, vocational training, and cultural programming through civil society organizations. However, implementation has been described by leading international institutions as piecemeal. The workshop therefore aims to explore, from a comparative perspective, the causes of violence at the sub-national level in Latin America and the Caribbean and to suggest possible ways to remedy this situation.

Panel one: Setting the Stage-The Economic and Institutional Context
Hermann's presentation raises a number of questions related to the issue of economic and institutional context. These include but are not limited to the following: How can one make sense of the resilience of "authoritarian enclaves" in post-transitioning Latin American countries? What tools and approaches help us to further our understanding of this phenomenon? What does it tell us about authoritarian continuity and democratic change? What role for agency and structure in the struggles for social domination? Why are clientelism and violence essential elements in these struggles for social domination?

Jean Daudelin, moves beyond the focus on state-society relations and neo-patrimonialism to show instead that there have been two hegemonic trends in the study of violence. The national approach, which focuses on big processes, has been mostly popular in the discourse adopted by policy institutions. Daudelin calls the other approach, a local-level one, "the tale of two favelas".

Julian Durazo Herrmann, "Clientelism, State Violence and Sub-national demoncratic consolidation in Latin America"
          Durazo Hermann deals with the issue of authoritarian continuity and democratic change at the sub-national level in post-transition Latin American countries. In particular, he underscores the widespread usage of "authoritarian enclaves" in academic circles. These discussions, he argues, have contributed to a conceptual mess. This has also provided the backdrop against which Durazo Hermann seeks to unpack the patterns of democratic change and authoritarian

continuity. This allows for a better understanding of the nature of state-society relations and the struggles for sub-national social domination that undergird them.

Durazo Hermann seeks to assess the quality of post-transition sub-national regimes. In order to do so, he suggests moving away from the institutional definitions of democracy and authoritarianism to argue for an approach that allows us to put these regimes in their broader social context. According to Durazo Herrmann, democracy is rooted in the protection of civil and political rights, and in the capacity of people to participate in politics. From this perspective, the presence of authoritarian enclaves has less to do with territory and more to do with policy domains. Authoritarianism is defined by limited pluralism, and the absence of political accountability. Durazo Hermann therefore invites us to move beyond hard categories that obscure the dimensions of struggles for political domination.

In this regard, local systems of social domination determine "the exercise of power, the establishment of hierarchy and legitimacy" which also help us to underscore subnational democratic change and authoritarian continuity (2). Durazo Hermann proposes to analyze the relationship between regime type and the broader quest for social domination from a Migdalian "state-in-society" approach. From this perspective, neither states nor societies are homogenous; rather they both suffer from deep factionalism. Furthermore, the state's capacity to penetrate society and wrest social control is not given but should be the object of research. Furthermore, Latin American societies are complex and exhibit different patterns of power, hierarchy and legitimacy that can at best be understood through the lens of neo-patrimonialism which is defined as "a mixed social domination type of modern and traditional conceptions of political legitimacy" (3).

This approach also paves the way for an analysis on how clientelism and violence become central issues "in ongoing struggles for social domination where the state and social actors are involved in coalition-building processes" (Ibid). Borrowing from Hilgers, Durazo Herrmann defines clientelism as an exchange-based relationship between a political elite that has access to goods and a poor clientele that is willing to provide political support in return for access to resources and benefits. In such contexts, elections ensure the entrenchment of hierarchical forms of inclusions that might facilitate and accommodate democratic and non-democratic practices (Hilgers 2012). Furthermore, elections do not necessarily mount a challenge to the existing systems of social domination but rather contribute to their consolidation. Furthermore, the fractiousness of social organizations paves the way for the adoption of a divide and rule strategy by political leaders, further undermining accountability systems. These patterns have also been accompanied by the renewal of personalistic forms of leadership. This is especially the case when it comes to the issue of socio-political mediation whereby social organizations and the political parties are invited to take their issues to governors.

Durazo Hermann argues that state violence, is undergirded by the idea of impunity and the rule of law, which enables people's access to the public arena and therefore sustains democracy. He suggests a focus on police reform. This underlies patterns of domination and contestation and allows for a better assessment of the "rule of law". On this particular issue, he proposes to address the following issues: police reforms, the conception of the police roles in post-transition Latin American countries and how these conceptions shape police training and finally taking a turn with the norms and the practices that may arise from dealing with the new conceptions but in particular how notions of human rights and police accountability are enforced in society at large.

Durazo Hermann proposes to delve into a comparative sub-national analysis of Oaxaca (Mexico) and Bahia (Brazil). These cases share patterns of authoritarian enclaves and have completed an electoral transition. However, their social structures are drastically different; Bahia fits the neo-pluralist model whereas Oxaca fits a neo-corporatist model.

Jean Daudelin, "Hiding, Twisting and Showing"

Jean Daudelin seeks to assess the extent to which "national-level tendencies are driven and reflect or hide sub-national dynamics and conversely what may be missed from focusing on the subnational level" (2). The former focuses on large-scale structural, institutional and sometimes behavioral factors, whereas the latter is more focused on micro-dynamics. Daudelin argues that the two approaches are inadequate for explaining the high levels of violence at the sub–national level and examines the cases of Brazil and Colombia.

Daudelin advances an argument rooted in the variation of homicide rates at the local level. Aside from high levels of violence, the homicide rates in Latin America also exhibit "immense variation between regions, cities, and even neighbourhoods, which implies that national averages are likely to be misleading" (2). Furthermore, rapid changes in the rates of violence at the municipal level suggest that national variables cannot explain the fast changing homicide rates. However, he also argues that this analysis is based on homicide statistics that have taken into consideration dead men only; while female homicide rates exhibit different patterns. A gendered focus presents us with a serious puzzle, namely that focusing on the sub-national level could obscure the structural variable that will help us explain female homicide (3). This begs the question on whether we should dismiss the national-level of analysis and the structural variables altogether?

Looking at the case of Brazil, the author shows that structural variables such as urbanization, the percentages of poor young men, immigration and education levels, fail to capture the wide explosion of violence in Latin America (6). At the same time, institutionalism with its focus on the limited capacity of the state, processes of democratization, and lack of territorial control falls short in trying to explain why, for instance, some countries with very limited state capacity exhibit low levels of violence (6). The most promising approach, according to Daudelin, is one rooted in the "the illegal markets, that involve drug trafficking organizations, the police and political authorities at the local level" (7). However, the author also suggests that we should not totally dismiss the structural variables when we want to consider volatility rather than the levels of violence and the "dynamics of homicides against women as well as the eruption of violence in low-violence countries" (8). Daudelin proposes that an approach looking at different levels of analysis might help us better explain sub-national violence.

Panel Two - Brazil

The discussion during this panel brought fresh theoretical and empirical insights. Arias' presentation raised a series of questions: are high levels of violence in Brazil explained by the presence of "ungoverned spaces"? Or alternatively are the Brazilian neighborhoods governed by different regimes that bring together state and non-state actors? In particular, what role do criminal factions play in producing these alternative regimes ("localized orders") that lead to governance at the local level? How does the relationship between the state and these criminal factions define governance, politics and local development at the sub-national level in Brazil? What policies are needed to remedy this situation?

While Arias pays attention to the rise of "localized orders", Gay's paper seeks to shed light on the intrinsic relationship between the drug cartels, the prison system, the UPPS and the militias. While doing so, Gay raises the following questions: what are the origins of these criminal factions? What is the impact of the legacies of authoritarianism and the prison system under military rule on the current drug cartels? What is the intrinsic relationship that links these criminal factions, the police, the prison system, and the militias in Rio de Janeiro? What are the implications for the local communities when the state uses outright repression in the favelas?

Finally, Barbosa, a co-director of the Observatorio de Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, identifies problems with existing public policy for stopping violence and discusses an initiative in which his organization has been involved.

Enrique Desmond Arias, "The Impacts of Differential Armed Dominance of Politics in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil"

Arias sets out to challenge the arguments that have blamed the problem of violence in Latin America on institutional failures. Underlying these arguments is the idea that the control of urban space by criminal factions epitomizes the emergence of "ungoverned spaces" (263) and the failure of the rule of law (265). The author dispels the "governance deficit" argument to show that networks of complicity and cooperation that tie criminal factions and state actors have ensured governance at the local level in Rio de Janeiro. In this regard, the presence of these criminal organizations has actually contributed to, rather than undermined, local governance through the rise of "localized orders" at the micro-level (Ibid). These "localized orders" are embedded in the local political and economic conditions and are shaped by "the structures of local criminal organizations" (282). These regimes have led to the incorporation of the "marginalized and impoverished factions in the economic and political life under conditions of dependency and violence into a wider political system whose protagonists often collaborate with local armed groups to obtain votes" (Ibid).

Arias builds on state-society relations theories to advance a typology of four localized armed regimes. The author classifies these regimes based on the degree that a criminal faction controls local civil life (criminal consolidation) and the relationship of the armed groups in a particular area with the state (proximity between armed factions and the state). This typology allows him to delve into a comparative analysis of the differential impact that two armed groups (a police-connected protection racket and a drug gang), have over sub-national political development in Rocinha and Rio das Pedras (Ibid).

The two neighborhoods share a number of institutional similarities but exhibit differences on the "localized armed regimes". Rocinha fits the category of shared criminal/civil leadership where a combination of high consolidation and low proximity provides armed groups with "leverage to control civic groups"(266). However, these strong non-state actors also need to proceed carefully in order to shield themselves from an outright confrontation with state authority" (Ibid). Rio das Pedras fits within the category of consolidated/criminal state partnership categories. In this case, the strong partnership between criminal factions and state actors leads to increased public security and lower levels of violence but it also allows criminal factions to control every aspect of citizen's life.

Arias traces the origins of these criminal organizations to the social, political and economic contexts that underlie each neighborhood. Rocinha, located on a touristic beach front, provided a fertile ground for the rise of the drug gangs with deeply contentions relations with the state. Civic leaders also became the principal mediators between criminal factions and the state

officials. Rio das Pedras' location provided fewer incentives for the rise of drug gangs. However, the neighborhood hosted a criminal faction that has engaged in "less noxious economic activities and forged an alliance with the political leaders (278). The cohesiveness of this criminal faction and its ability to control local life contributed to the strengthening of its relationship with political leaders vying for votes" (279).

The two cases are a perfect illustration that armed factions are far from being fixed; they have actually evolved over time thus yielding different outcomes on local governance in the two neighborhoods (278-280). In this regard, the comparative analysis at the sub-national level attests for the different levels of armed consolidation and criminal dominance that shaped community life in these two neighborhoods. Conflicts emerged when consolidation was weakened and the relationship with the state became strained. A stronger and more collaborative relationship with the state owes to the capacity of the armed factions to control "economic, political, and civic activities" (ibid: 281). The political context constrained the structure of these organizations. The drug gang, as in Rocinha, was forced to maintain a very limited relation with state officials. This allowed it to avoid publicizing its activities, which risked drawing the attention of non-collaborative state actors (278 and 281). In contrast, the armed factions in Rio das Pedras established more "collaborative relations with elements of the state and count on members being able to secure public office themselves" (281).

Arias concludes by stressing the need for "addressing the concerns of community residents, controlling police corruption in these areas, and creating more stable, institutionalized systems to deal with the range of complex issues facing local residents" (282). Despite some efforts to fight drug trafficking in Brazil, the author calls for more radical measures that will bring about new systems of governance that will "address the particular needs of local residents and effectively channel those demands to the state" (Ibid).

Robert Gay, "Of Criminal Factions, UPPS and Militias: The State of Public Insecurity in Rio de Janeiro"

Robert Gay delves into the origins of Rio de Janeiro's criminal factions and the relationship between armed groups, the prison system, and the police system. Gay draws on the legacies of authoritarianism to show that criminal factions in Rio de Janeiro are not a new phenomenon; rather they emerged in the prison system under military rule. In particular, Commando Vermelho (CV), a drug gang, originally adopted a revolutionary discourse and sought to control the Ilha Grande prison that served the military regime to torture and punish political opposition.

These criminal factions later on turned to engage in drug trafficking. Despite the fact that Brazil is not popular for producing drugs, it has been turned into an important transshipment route for cocaine. This has transformed drug trade into a lucrative business that the CV tried to monopolize. This quest by CV was also met by intense conflicts over who can actually control Rio's favelas as they provide the most fertile grounds for drug trading and distribution. The CV's ability to operate inside the favelas is constrained by its relationship with local communities (5). The latter provided not only "human resources" for gang business but a refuge to cover up for operations. In return, drug cartels provided social services and took advantage of the state's absence to implement their laws while rewarding supporters and punishing defectors.

The context of Brazil's second transition to democracy provides the context for the emergence of these drug gangs. The elected governor focused his campaign on the plight of the favelas and opposed the criminalization of poverty (7). However, factionalism within the CV

ranks gave way to two new drug gangs: the Terceiro Commando and Amigos dos Amigos. These divisions led to the restructuring of the prison system and fed into the competition between the two emerging factions. With the election of a new governor, hard line policies were put in place, which also increased the indiscriminate killing of innocent citizens and young adolescents.

Gay argues that these policies were largely inefficient, as they did not take into consideration the organizational structure of the criminal organizations and their absolute control over the prison system. The almost absence of hierarchy in these organizations led to the easy replacement of one criminal leader with another. Furthermore, the prominent presence of these criminal organizations and their ability to provide protection and social goods to prisoners has turned them into the main benefactors for those who are sentenced to prison. This has further entrenched criminal identity. This overt control over the prison system has also prohibited any form of mixing between the various criminal factions, as it risks degenerating into outright violence.

The police corruption and its deep involvement in the drug-business turned the confrontation between the drug gangs and the police into a struggle over who "gets what share of the spoils" (11). The prison system is also permeable to guns, drugs, cellphones, etc. (12). Finally, Gay argues that "violence breeds more violence" (Ibid). When criminal factions are subject to greater coercion, they run after acquiring more powerful weapons. But most importantly, police violence "undermined trust from the local communities thus driving them further to the arm of the traffickers who are at least know to them" (12).

In light of the pending decision about the Olympics, the Brazilian authorities took the decision to spread the UPPs, which were commissioned to hold onto the favelas (14). However, many issues challenged the ability of the UPP to ensure public security and triggered public controversy. These include: the high costs for establishing the UPP, corruption inside the police ranks, and the question of political will. This begs the question of how long will a commitment to reduce violence be sustained and whether the state will make any real investment in order to overcome inequality problems that have plagued the favelas? But most importantly would the UPP sustain itself in the place of an ever-growing favela population?

Public authorities' countering-strategy has tolerated the rise of militias as a mean to combat drug trade violence; however this policy has been the subject of great controversy with the publication of a report that underscored the militia's high levels of criminality, their brutal and corrupt nature. However, as Gay argued the resources that were later allocated to fight these militias were largely insufficient. Furthermore, and while the state projects this endeavor as "going against the criminal factions, it is in reality going after its own men" (Ibid). So far the measures have failed to bear fruit due to the lack of state capacity and will (24).

Raquel Willadino and Jorge Luiz Barbosa, "Homicídios de jovens negros no Brasil e os desafios à construção de uma agenda de superação da violência letal"

Brazil is marked by social inequality and violence reproduces unequal power relations through the violation of rights in gender, race, ethnic, class, and generational relations. Homicide is one of the most serious expressions of discrimination. The annual homicide rate is approximately 50.000 and the highest risk population is young black males living in favelas and city peripheries. Homicides are linked to interpersonal conflicts, drugs and arms trafficking, police violence, and extermination groups, and often involve territorial struggles. Although the concentration of homicides among youth has been a significant characteristic of the country for over two decades, public policy focusing on the problem is still lacking. Since existing policy is

primarily repressive and the socioeconomic profile of the homicide victims is overwhelmingly young, black, poor males, the value of the victims' lives is perceived as low and society remains silent. Since 2000, advances have been made with the *Plano Nacional de Segurança Pública*, the *Fundo Nacional de Segurança Pública*, the proposal for the *Sistema Único de Segurança Pública* (SUSP) and, more recently, the PRONASCI, the Agenda Social and the PNDH3. But, for the moment, most initiatives only touch lethal violence with adolescente and youth victims indirectly.

The *Observatório de Favelas* works in the field of human rights with a focus on the violence affecting residents of popular spaces and, in particular, adolescence and youth. The institution conducts studies and devises methods to generate strategies for dealing with urban violence that bring together civil society and the state and have the potential to generate public policy.

In 2005, UNICEF identified relevant issues such as: the lack of reliable data in this area, the disarticulation of preventive initiatives, difficulties in replicating and sustaining local programs and projects, and the low impact of existing activities in reducing violence. As a result, the Observatório de Favelas initiated the *Programa de Redução da Violência Letal contra Adolescentes e Jovens* (PRVL) in coordination with the *Secretaria Nacional de Promoção dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente*, UNICEF, and the *Laboratório de Análise da Violência* of the *Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro*. This program aims to sensitize and mobilize society, generate adolescent and youth homicide monitoring indicators, and identify and disseminate methods to reduce this violence. This program is now present in 11 metropolitan regions: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Vitória, Recife, Salvador, Maceió, Belém, Região Integrada de Desenvolvimento do Distrito Federal e Entorno, Curitiba, and Porto Alegre.

The program has highlighted the necessity of articulating the strategies of municipal, state, and federal levels of government. Local assessments are key to understanding the types of targeted killings in the region, the profile of victims and perpetrators, the places where deaths occur, and the dynamics related to lethal violence. City administrations are also closest to the population and have critical resources and services for successful preventive intervention, such as urban security, education, health, culture, sport, leisure, social services, and urban planning, among others. The program aims to provide a locally adaptable guide for municipal managers drafting policies.

From 2009 to 2010, fieldwork in the 11 metropolitan regions showed that existing programs were the result of diagnostics regarding the nature and magnitude of the problem, that they are territorially specific, combine redistributive policies, and articulate various public agencies and civil society, as well as including community participation. However, these programs require independent monitoring and assessment and the assessment needs to impact program design. Also, more programs aimed specifically at preventing *lethal* violence and particularly among youth and adolescents are necessary.

Fieldwork also involved workshops with groups of young people living in affected areas. They state convincingly that age, gender, race, and territory are structural dimensions of lethal violence that have not been sufficiently addressed by public policy. They reiterate that the existing diagnosis is old and stagnant, while young blacks, residents of slums and peripheries are still dying every day and society is silent on the problem, which has become naturalized - and sometimes even legitimized. They feel that investment in social awareness processes to contribute to the transformation of this framework would be useful. Youth groups have been connected to violence prevention primarily through cultural activities, especially the hip hop

movement and community communication. These groups are strong in areas with high rates of mortality and can sensitize other youth to the theme through music, photography, visual and textual production, and other forms of communication. They have been engaged in an important symbolic struggle to produce new representations of popular environments emphasizing the wealth, potential, and diversity of current social practices in these contexts. These contribute decisively to breaking the stereotypes that stigmatize and criminalize the residents of slums and peripheries and associate these spaces with violence. Young people also indicate that many existing public policies in their municipalities are far from dealing with their priorities. They would like greater participation in formulating the spatial and social control of public policy.

In 2007, the *Agenda Social Criança e Adolescente* established *a Compromisso Nacional pela Redução da Violência contra Crianças e Adolescentes*. Since then, important steps have been taken to prioritize the issue of teenage homicides on the public agenda. However, there are still significant challenges. We must:

- strengthen cooperation among the three levels of government with a view to prioritizing the issue of young people's mortality and linking their coping strategies,
- form a national tripartite committee focused on setting goals and strategies to facilitate the construction of a national policy for reducing adolescents and youth homicides,
- mobilize the Human Rights Councils at all three levels to guarantee budget forecasting and PPA for actions against lethal violence,
- generate intersectoral police action that is based in human rights and uses coordinated and territorially circumscribed preventive social intervention that stimulates community participation,
- strengthen the role of local policies for preventing lethal violence against adolescents and youth; promote local diagnostics to enable further understanding of causes and contexts of adolescent and youth homicides, the profiles of victims and perpetrators, the characteristics of the hardest hit areas, and other elements that can help to construct plans appropriate to specific local prevention,
- increase investment in the processes of program monitoring and evaluation and violence prevention projects developed by states and municipalities, and
- promote the participation of young people in the formulation and social control of public policies for the prevention of lethal violence; incorporate the perspective of these groups and residents of areas most affected by homicide as a decisive measure for building strategies sensitive to the peculiarities of different contexts and the multidimensionality of the problem

Panel Three - Colombia

Juan Diego Prieto and Kent Eaton deal with the debate initiated by Julian Durazo Hermann on the issue of regime change and continuity. The authors seek to investigate the "regime juxtaposition" between democratic national governments and subnational authoritarian enclaves in the case of the Colombian unitary state. Juan Darío Ramírez Adarve provides a historical overview of the armed conflict in Medellín, including descriptions of the groups involved, the importance of territorial control, the cycles of violence, and attempts to counter them.

Kent Eaton and Juan Diego Prieto, "Subnational Authoritarianism in Colombia: Divergent Paths in Cesar and Magdalena"

Eaton and Prieto explore the resilience of non-democratic practices at the sub-national level in democratic Colombia. Real political power is vested in the hands of strong societal

actors, whereas the state and the application of rule of law are almost absent. The question in theoretical terms is therefore how one can reconcile democracy at the national level and the systematic abuses of democratic rights at the subnational level? But most importantly, what explains the resilience of these non-democratic practices at the sub-national level? And finally how can one address the issue of subnational authoritarianism and replace it by a more democratic system?

The authors advance an explanation of sub-national authoritarianism by integrating a "regime juxtaposition" approach where two "levels of government operate under different regimes" (4). They argue that local actors at the subnational level have not only been resistant to the intervention of national actors but they have also controlled institutions at the national level. However the authors draw a distinction between the Colombian case on the one hand and the Mexican and the Argentinian cases on the other. This difference can be explained by examining three factors: unitarism, militarism, and horizontalism (3). Unitarism emphasizes decentralization that has made regime juxtaposition in Colombia quite likely. On the militarism dimension, the authors underscore that in Colombia there has been a heavy reliance on private armies that makes sub-national authoritarianism in this country more volatile and unstable. "Horizontalism cuts both ways – the greater interconnectedness between subnational autocrats that we see in Colombia (through their common, paramilitary allies) has increased their coherence as a bancada, but simultaneously raised their visibility and hence vulnerability".

The two cases under scrutiny, Cesar and Magdalena, share a number of political, economic, and structural similarities, and both have been ruled by the same paramilitary faction (18). However, they exhibit differences on the dependent variable, namely the path that they have adopted. Magdalena's political landscape continues to be dominated by the same political clan, whereas in Cesar the AUC-clan allies have disappeared from political life. This difference at the subnational level is best explained by the pre-scandal party dynamics whereby in Cesar the Regional integration movement remained independent from paramilitary domination.

The authors seek to extend Gibson's argument to the Colombian cases. They start with the parochialization of power. The democratization process threatened to derail and challenge the power of the traditional leaders namely the mayors and the governors who turned to strike deals with paramilitary organizations to maintain their hold on power and sideline local democratic opposition forces (7). The nationalization of influence finds great echo in Colombia. In fact, the paramilitary leaders in Colombia expected that the elected national leaders would defend their interests in congress. "It is primarily when the paramilitary leaders tried to rapidly nationalize their influence in the hopes of controlling Congress and refounding the republic did democratic actors with the national context respond with more overt crackdown on the paramilitary leaders and their subnational allies" (8 - 9). Finally, the monopolization of linkages emphasizes the need to examine the center not as a unitary actor but as a constellation of "institutional actors with particular territorial interests and preferences" (Ibid). On the one hand, "president Uribe used his powers to defend and protect the actors implicated in the paramilitary scandals. The latter formed an essential part of the president's governing coalition and provided critical support for judicial, electoral, penal and agrarian reforms (11). On the other hand, the judiciary and the Supreme Court emerged as main opponents to subnational authoritarianism. Hence, one of the ironies of the regime juxtaposition in Colombia is the significant conflict within and not just across levels of government (10).

The two cases exhibit similarity on a number of variables, which allows them to advance an explanation rooted in party dynamics. In this regard, the political opening in Cesar saw the

light with the rise of a departmental party. "Whereas the moderation of Moreno's MIR likely saved it from repression at the hands of the AUC, its independence from paramilitary domination was sufficient to produce a meaningful rupture with parapolitics, and therefore with subnational authoritarianism" (36).

Iván Darío Ramírez Adarve, "Mafia, poder y territorio: El caso de Medellín, Colombia"

Ramírez presents a historical overview of violence in Colombia and Medellín, more specifically. He argues that it is impossible to understand violence in Medellin from a single perspective because it is contextually embedded. Poverty, inequality, cultural intolerance, impunity, political exclusion, corruption, and clientelism combine to generate the setting in which armed political conflict, a neoliberal economic program, and drug trafficking play out and violence has become naturalized.

Ramírez describes the geographic and socioeconomic divisions of the city, and identifies the various armed actors – the guerrillas, including FARC, ELN, and others; the paramilitary forces under the AUC umbrella; and the drug trafficking mafias – explaining that they fight for territorial domination in order to control economic, social, political, security, fiscal, and judiciary resources. He goes on to identify five cycles of violence (not necessarily succeeding but sometimes intersecting) that have affected Medellín. Cycle 1 is the emergence, consolidation, and weakening of the Medellín cartel from the early to the late 1980s. Cycle 2 is the urban guerrilla and milita project in the 1990s. Cycle 3 is the organized armed violence and paramilitary movement in the 1990s, and cycle 4 the paramilitary hegemony in the early 2000s. Cycle 5 is the struggle among organized violent armed actors and the persistence of paramilitary groups and practices until the present day. Finally, the author discusses the methods used by the city to counter violence – repression, social and infrastructural spending, and attempts to negotiate disarmament and pacts of non-aggression.

Ramírez concludes stating that Colombia is close to concluding peace accords with some of the oldest armed groups, but that the end of the armed conflict is not the end of violence. This will be difficult to counter, given the armed actors' consolidation, territorial control, and influence, as well as the weakness of the state and its policies.

Panel Four- Jamaica and El Salvador
Jamaica and El Salvador provide fresh insight to the ongoing debates on the causes of violence and the policies to contain them. Levy advances an explanation of violence in Jamaica rooted in the concept of the "predatory" state. In this regard, the political parties in Jamaica are bent to hold on to power and they have used violence and clientelism to ensure their survival. Clarke and Campbell's co-authored paper turns to another set of interesting question that pay attention to the role of class and race owing to the legacies of colonialism. This discussion also brings back the concept of citizenship and respect that has been denied the most marginalized in Jamaica. Central to the two papers is a focus on territoriality and the garrison communities. The latter are seen according to Clarke and Campbell as territorial extensions of "political tribalism". The authors also suggest different avenues to address the problem of violence. Levy underscores the role of civil society; Clarke and Campbell underscore trust; Rivard Piché discusses the role of truce. In fact, her paper on El Salvador emphasizes state weakness, which is measured by the ability, or its lack, to have monopoly over the use of force and the strength of the armed groups.

Horace Levy, "Democracy, Clientelism, Violence in Jamaica"

Horace Levy advances an institutional argument rooted in the role of the two main political parties (People's National Party and Jamaica Labor Party) in Jamaica in perpetrating violence. By doing so, Levy challenges the cultural assumptions that there is a "gene of a warlike west-african ancestors". Political tribalism, where the political leaders from the two parties offered protection and services to their citizens in return for political support and loyalty, is not the natural outgrowth of the political process. It is rather a clever strategy devised by the politicians to ensure their hold on power. Parties are therefore bent on ensuring their survival in power thus making "politics the overriding value to which every other value could be subsumed" (Ibid). In this regard, and though elections were marred with fraud, this has never led to the cancellation of the results, leading Levy to argue that democracy in Jamaica is stalled.

One of the serious implications of the polarization of Jamaican politics along partisan lines is the way it has shaped the concept of citizenship. Jamaicans view themselves as Labourite or PNP comrades rather than citizens of their own country. The 1960s was the watershed in Jamaica that culminated in the creation of the labor party's garrison community in Tivoly Gardens (2). These communities were turned into totalitarian enclaves, where any form of political opposition towards the dominant party was subject to severe punishment. In exchange for political loyalty on election day, the garrisons offered their residents security and basic services. They also expanded beyond the capital city to become the "hallmark of Jamaican politics".

One of the serious implications of these garrisons is the fact that they have normalized violence. As Levy argues, looking at homicide rates as the only indicator of violence can be misleading as it fails to capture the intensity of the situation in Jamaica where a subculture of violence has emerged. But one of the main factors that transformed Jamaica into a fertile ground for violence is the rising level of inequality, which has been met by mounting police repression. Three types of gangs seem to be the main perpetrators of violence: the street gangs, the local gangs and the internationally connected gangs. This overlooks the violence perpetrated by the police that have not engaged in rape, robbery, drugs, etc. Both defense crews and criminal factions have been the ones benefiting from violence promoted by politicians. However the criminal ones have been more tied to the clientelistic networks revolving around political parties. Both-defense crews and thugs were used deliberately by political parties to sway public opinion in their own favor (7). The question then is how did Jamaica deal with high levels of violence? Levy points to a three-fold approach. First, the establishment of the inefficient and weak Jamaican Constabulary Force; second, the electoral committee that managed to eliminate electoral fraud and violence; finally, the role that civil society initiative plays in curbing violence. This civil society initiative has engaged in initiating a dialogue between the fighting factions; it has also offered community services for the youth and women and gave primacy to community development as an alternative to police violence in order to eliminate violence and vote buying.

Colin Clarke and Yonique Campbell, "Politics, Security and Citizenship in Jamaica: The Class Dimension in Kingston"
Clarke and Campbell take issue with how the organization of violence exercises class rule. The legacies of colonialism have left a deep impact on Jamaica's politics and though the country seems to have gained independence, it continues to struggle with the same problems. The greatest problem, from this perspective are the lower classes, who not only constitute 30% of the population but are also among the most impoverished, segregated, and marginalized from

the system. These issues intercept with the race dimension whereby the black are considered as non-citizens, and hence unworthy of respect. In this regard, the garrisons do not only bring protection and social services to their inhabitants but Dones provide respect for the marginalized communities

The authors also stress the important theme of "violent political tribalism" which has come to define Jamaican politics and its spatial expression, the rise and the evolution of the garrison communities in the capital city. However, one of the central concerns for Clarke and Campbell is the intrinsic relationship that binds class and territory and hence the spatial dimension of sub-national violence in Jamaica's Kingston. This interaction is the object of investigation. Political violence is shown to have fragmented Kingston into zones along class-lines.

The authors move beyond the arguments made by Levy concerning the role of political parties in perpetuating violence to argue instead that in the garrison communities of Tivoli Gardens the main issue is related to the concept of de facto citizenship. This has transformed sub-national violence into a seductive force in Jamaica. "Clientelism, multi-class politics, urban spatial segregation and the use of dons to provide respect and remedy the need for security have served to further consolidate sub-national violence" (Ibid). With the advent of neo-liberalism, the situation has worsened considerably as it aggravated the state's retreat from the welfare and well-being of the citizens. These have been accompanied by mounting challenges to state legitimacy that further complicate the picture.

The authors also conclude that the implementation of substantive security policy changes in Jamaica entails a radical overhaul of the "legal, social, political, and economic order of society" (Ibid). In this regard, the authors suggest that there is a need to move beyond the don logic to adopt solutions that provide policy practices taking the local into consideration.

Gaëlle Rivard Piché, "When Maras Make Peace: Insights on Security Sector Governance in El Salvador"

Rivard Piché deals with state weakness; especially its inability to monopolize the use of force in El Salvador. Informal actors have filled the gap of an unwilling or weak state at the sub-national level, contributing to the creation of a "public order" regime. To understand the drop out in the levels of violence, Rivard Piché turns to the mechanisms at the local level that paved the way for formal and informal policing actors to interact on a daily basis.

In El Salvador, the criminal gangs (MS13 and La18) cohabited with formal security sectors inside a "pluralist public order regime". The national truce concluded between the two policing actors reduced levels of violence and created opportunities for marginalized factions. In this regard, the author argues that a "pluralist public order regime" contributes to the reduction of levels of violence and improves local governance, as is the case of llopango.

The public order regime in El Salvador was shaped by the demobilization of former combatants, the reduction of army strength and the creation of the PNC, the new national police. The gangs emerged in the 1980s. Almost twenty years after their creation, the state engaged in a mission to face these cliques and restore social control at a time when the gangs had already imposed themselves over the local communities and engaged in violent means to expand their territorial control. Although past theories suggest that several policing actors compete to impose different norms and rules, this competition arguably can also lead to agreements that aim at reducing violence in a "pluralist policing regime". However, in order to reach an agreement a

number of conditions need to be met. There must be few parties, information asymmetry, and party guarantees.

The author also advances a classical rational-choice argument: the truce in El Savador opened space for dialogue between the actors at the local level and revealed the behavior of different actors, thus reducing uncertainty. The truce created a space for dialogue and negotiations, limiting the ability of rival cliques. The president, however, never fully endorsed the negotiation process. Despite these contradictory stances, the local agreements saw the light of day and had a positive impact on curbing violence, transforming the public order regimes, and creating new opportunities for the gang members and the population of llopango. In fact, the dedication of the local gangs to a peace process elevated them to the status of public figures. Rivard Piché also draws attention to the important role that third parties, namely religious and community leaders, play in pushing the agreement process forward.

Geographical proximity increases tension and competition between the two rival gangs. The two factions in llopango emerged as strong societal actors who control citizens' behavior based on certain rules. It is mainly the fear of coercion that has come to define the minute details of the day-to-day activities of the residents. "Until the truce, a large part of the violence in llopango was the result of the constant need by the gangs to reaffirm their authority" (16). The truce also gave way to a win-win situation. The gangs used their compliance by the terms of the truce as "a token of exchange to access the social and economic opportunities for their own communities" (Ibid). The PNC benefited from its outlook as it started to look more effective. Furthermore, the truce also paved the way for different actors to agree on keeping the levels of violence low, share information and keep the avenues for dialogue open. However, the interests of the local government were less in preserving the peace process and more inclined towards adopting disruptive strategies undermining the process at both the local and national levels. This was accompanied by changes in the PNC leadership, which started to use outright repression against the gangs. These disruptive strategies undermined the agreement at the local level and affected trust.

In conclusion, Rivard Piché draws on the weakness of the El Salvadoran state to argue that strong societal actors (gangs) shaped the quality of public order regimes and controlled violence. The deals between the formal and informal policing actors in a pluralist public order regime reduced violence and improved the overall governance of the security sector. In particular, the author argues that "when there is a lot at stake", namely when the policing actors have common interests, or when it becomes possible to share information through dialogue and negotiation, the agreements between the different policing actors can become an effective public security tool.

Panel 5 - Mexico
The paper by Müller has engaged with the issues of democratic change and authoritarian continuity in the case of Mexico City. The main innovation by Markus has been the suggestion to address the overlooked yet equally important dimension of clientelism, namely bureaucratic clientelism. His focus is on the production and reproduction of the police forces' patronage networks that emerged under the PRI rule and were only extended under the PRD rule. He also seeks to contribute to the citizenship debate and puts forth the notion of second-class citizens that have been marginalized by the advent of neo-liberalism and urban restructuring in post-transition Mexico City. Macdonald and Luccisano also address the question of legitimacy but from a different angle. They engage with the social policies that have been adopted by the PRD and that

did not only address the problems of inequality and poverty but also contributed to tame the high levels of violence in Mexico City. The authors underscore the engagement of citizens in these programs that have contributed to building networks of trust and taming violence. Simmons examines violence against migrants in Mexico and advances an alternative definition of violence based on Galtung's model.

Markus Michael Müller, "The Clientelist Bases of Insecurity and Police Violence in Democratic Mexico City"

Müller's paper deals with the marriage between clientelism and violence, the role of the police, and how these mechanisms interact to entrench a system that punishes what he calls second class citizens who have suffered from this link among (institutional) clientelism, violence, and the enforcement of a neo-liberal economic model in post-transition Mexico City.

Müller pays specific attention to the concept of "violent democracies" in Mexico City. He investigates the resilience of patron-client relationships and brings back a discussion anchored in the citizen's daily struggles that ensures their incorporation in contexts of high inequality. Müller's central concern is to move beyond state-society relations to investigate how this central yet neglected aspect of patron-client networks, its institutional component, sustained clientelism and violence in post-transition Mexico City. He focuses on police violence perpetrated against those engaged in informal economies. Furthermore, the democratization process in Mexico has contributed to the expansion of the clientelist bases of "extralegal police violence" (2).

According to Müller, this is intrinsically linked to the PRD's quest to regain control over the police force that brought changes at the national level but left extralegal police violence and the clientelistic networks that underlie them intact. This extended beyond the bureaucratic realm to touch on programs of citizen participation in the realm of security governance. These have become entangled in the clientelistic networks, enabling the appropriation of "public" violence for private ends.

These developments should also be linked to the PRD's adoption of neo-liberalism and its quest towards transforming Mexico City into a globalized city. Central to this strategy are two key features that entrenched the bureaucratic clientelism revolving around the police forces. Urban restructuring that underlies the neoliberal project has also been accompanied by a criminalization of poverty and the informal economies. This has further entrenched a system of clientelist protection. This is namely because those who engaged in the informal sector turned to the protection offered by bureaucrats/police forces and politicians, which resulted in the politicization and the popularization of police violence. City residents oiled the wheels of the police forces trough bribery and the purchase of the police forces' services. While some enjoyed the benefits of these clientelistic exchanges, the most vulnerable suffered from marginalization and repression.

Müller also underscores the legacies of authoritarianism in shaping the patterns of patron-client networks that have come to determine the dynamics of Mexico City's police force. He argues that most of the police apparatus is made up of revolutionaries-turned-civil servants. This has entrenched their autonomy from the political elites. In order to draw the police forces closer to the political system, the PRI adopted a two-fold strategy of cooptation that immersed Mexico City's police force in a web of patron-client networks. In exchange of their loyalty to the political leaders, the police force was awarded absolute impunity over its engagement in illicit activities. As long as the police fulfilled their duties in taming the streets by repressing against any form of political dissent, the politicians had sworn to turn a blind eye over the violations

perpetrated by the police. The PRI's twofold strategy left a serious impact on the police forces in post-transition Mexico City. Firstly, the PRI adopted a strategy of absolute militarization of the police forces turning them into a highly hierarchical body where the lower echelons of the police could not hold their superiors accountable. This "pyramidal" system also turned the high-ranks in the police apparatus into "patrons" who disbursed patronage that took various forms: promotion, employment, etc. To further entrench this rent-seeking system, the president appointed and dismissed the police chief. The political leaders turned a blind eye on the serious violations committed by the police, which was bent on expanding its political and economic activities through illicit activities as long as the police prevented any forms of political opposition to the PRI rule.

One of the hallmarks of post-transition Mexico City is the lingering of these politicized, informal practices of the police force: "the local democratization process destroyed the existing levels of political control and governability of Mexico City policing by enhancing the autonomy of the police force vis-à-vis the Mexico City government" (11). The fragile yet resilient nature of these clientelistic practices, was further aggravated by the "metropolization of crime" (Ibid).

The rising crime rates in post-transition Mexico City transformed the issue of police reforms as a central concern for the PRD. This also raised the issue of reforming the police force, which was seriously opposed by the "resistance enclaves" inside the police apparatus. The PRD became aware of the need to curtail the increased autonomy of the police force and the democratically elected incumbents were primarily bent on "establishing control over the local police force by regaining their loyalty" (12). This led to the adoption of cosmetic reforms that left the patronage base of the police intact. It has also been accompanied by channeling significant amounts of resources to the police forces that not only expanded the patronage networks of the police force but also led to a situation where recruitment of new personnel was politicized rather than based on merit appointments. Müller argues that, while clientelism and corruption should be distinguished, in Mexico City these two practices were closely linked as it transformed police corruption into a "state-strengthening graft" (14). "This is namely due to the fact that the clientelist political machines use their social proximity to voters to monitor their actions and types and hence to enforce the implicit and redistributive contract" (Ibid).

Laura Macdonald and Lucy Luccisano, "Guns and Butter: Social Policy, Neo-Clientelism, and Efforts to Reduce Violence in Mexico City"

Macdonald and Luccisano's paper also examines Mexico City but they move away from a focus on the coercive means to engage with questions of how political leaders enforce their legitimacy through social policies. The central focus is therefore on the social policies and the evolving forms of democratic governance that emerged under the PRD in Mexico City. While structuralist, sociological, and historical institutional theories have underscored how inequality leads to violence, they all overlook the fact that social policies aimed at inequality and poverty curb violence. The authors argue that these policies lead to higher levels of social trust, which in turn contributes to curbing violence.

Since the election of the PRD, a number of policies have been put in place. This includes investments in disarmament and the promotion of a culture of peace as well as social policies that "perhaps because of their semi-clientelistic form created higher levels of social trust and stronger state-society relations and forms of informal government surveillance" that reduced violence in Mexico City. This has been accompanied, in post-transition Mexico, by processes that have changed the forms of governance towards more transparency and greater state presence

in the lives of their citizens. Hence, the lower levels of violence in Mexico City have a lot to do with the shift from "guns" to "butter".

The authors also underscore the necessity of moving away from a focus on how the state can police itself and society to suggest a framework where "citizens can actively engage with state institutions to provide effective security and basic rights in their neighborhoods" and to build new norms in which violence is denounced as a survival strategy or as a conflict-resolution method (7).

Victoria Simmons, "The securitization and humanitarianization of migration in Mexico: A critical view on recent efforts to end violence against migrants in Mexico"

Victoria Simmons studies the case of Violence Against Transit Migrants (VAM) who have fled their conflict-ridden countries (Guatemala, Honduras, etc) through the Mexican route to find sanctuary in the USA. Simons seeks to provide explanations for the explosion of VAM state responses while accounting for the regional variations and possible avenues to rethink solutions to this problem. Though VAM is not a new phenomenon, it has recently gathered national and international attention in the wake of the 2010 Tamaulipas massacre. Simmons moves beyond the narrow and traditional definitions of violence that include "homicides and kidnappings" to adopt Galtung's vicious violence triangle. This allows her to move beyond the direct forms of violence used against migrants and to delve into the cultural and structural forms of violence as well. This broader conceptualization of violence underscores the acts, the symbols, and the representations that intervene in the migrants' ability to satisfy their own needs. Central to this approach is the idea that violence can start in any of the three corners of Galtung's triangle and that the three forms of violence (direct, cultural and structural) interact in a way that will only breed more violence.

The Mexican state's response to instances of VAM is controversial. On the one hand, it has addressed instances of violence by using direct violence or by adopting the "violence of silence". This is best captured by invisibilization (making data on instances of VAM unavailable to the public), opacity and cover up, blame avoidance, and victim blaming to justify state inaction. Simmons concludes by stressing the need to break the vicious triangle of violence and to start imagining a virtuous triangle of peace. She stresses the need to re-imagine the actors involved (direct), the possibilities that will lead to virtuous processes (structural) and the values, ideas, knowledge (cultural).

Panel 6: Argentina
For the Argentine case, both Lapegna and Fournier underscore subnational variations in government characteristics and violence.

Pablo Lapegna, "Three Shades of Violence: Transgenic Agriculture, Rural Displacement, and Clientelist Provincial Governments in Argentina"

Lapegna adopts a sub-national comparative approach to account for the different forms of violence (direct, informal and symbolic) in three Argentine provinces (Santiago del Estero, Cordoba, and Formosa respectively) that have been brought about by the sweeping expansion of genetically modified (GM) crops. Lapegna's analysis advances an explanation of this variation rooted in the characteristics of sub-national governments.

After providing an overview of the economic, political, and territorial dynamics of soybean expansion in Argentina, Lapegna moves on to highlight the various trends in the three

cases. Santiago del Estero epitomizes a case of sub-national authoritarianism where the conflicts over territorial control have escalated into violent repression of peasant activists and culminated in the killing of the main activists in a leading peasant movement, MOCASE. Over two decades, Santiago del Estero has been controlled by a governor who resorted to "overt strategies of control, repression and surveillance over the citizenry" (8). When an ally of the Argentine president replaced the governor, the province witnessed a "soybean rush" that resulted in territorial expansion of GMs and the killing of two peasant activists (8). This has galvanized peasant activism around the protection of indigenous communities and stopping land evictions affecting the peasantry. Despite the fact that activists have been successful in gathering the support of some legislators, a related bill is still the subject of political debate.

In Cordoba, GM crop expansion caused environmental contamination and public health problems leading to the death of several citizens. The mother of one of the victims initiated the *Madres de Ituzaingo,* who went about gathering "evidence about diseases caused by environmental contamination and garnering the support of experts to document and address public health problems" (12). One of the main issues of contention that arose in the meetings organized by the *Madres de Ituzaingo,* was the cooptation of their movement by political leaders. Unlike the other two provinces, Cordoba's civil society is thriving and "competitive politics in this province resulted in a judiciary power that is greatly autonomous from the governors" (13). This has enabled the *Madres de Ituzaingo* to win the case against soybean growers accusing them of the "intentional environmental contamination" (Ibid). However, this coincided with the "installation of a Monsanto seed plant on the outskirts of Cordoba" (Ibid), which escalated into full-fledged violence between activists protesting against the construction company and the construction workers.

Formosa is one of Argentina's poorest provinces, where residents live on public employment and welfare. MoCafor, Formosa's peasant movement "has struggled to maintain its independence from the provincial government and has been successful in providing alternative strategies of survival" for Formosan peasants and rural workers (16). MoCafor's strongholds (Monte Azul and Moreno) also suffered from herbicide exposures. This triggered a reaction from provincial public officials and landowners' associations that was anchored in blame avoidance and victim-blaming (17). Though the provincial judge has issued an order against fumigation, she was dismissed from her position for taking such an overt position. Most importantly, MoCafor has become increasingly drawn to the political establishment as it became embedded in the clientelistic networks of the president. This led to a situation where "MoCafor opposed a provincial government that at the same time is an ally of the national government that MoCafor also supports. These dynamics created organizational barriers and ultimately resulted in a process of demobilization" (18). This has been accompanied by what Lapegna refers to as symbolic violence where the subjugated accept their condition, normalize it, and begin to accept the terms set forth by powerful political actors (19). Lapegna highlights distinct instances that account for the revelation of symbolic violence: disagreements among peasants on the issue of blame and the role of rumors.

Argentine activists who seek to challenge the expansion of GM have faced two evils that tried to tame social contention. The owners of agribusiness companies and the "authoritarian governments" that have purposefully turned a blind eye to the environmental problems or relied on patronage networks to impede social contention. The judiciary plays an important yet disparate role, with some activists winning judicial support and others not. These different results can be interpreted as a function of the different political structures of each sub-national regime.

Hugues Fournier, "Subnational politics in Argentina: diverging trajectories and transformation opportunities"

In 2013 Argentina celebrated its 30th year as a democracy, but progress toward deepening democracy has not been linear, with some provinces even sustaining regressions. This paper compares varying subnational processes leaning toward authoritarianism by focusing on party competition, and particularly the structure and path of the peronists, in the three peripheral provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and Tucuman.

The democratic transition in 1983 produced new procedures, institutions and political dynamics that clearly break from the past military and authoritarian regime. Provinces have universal suffrage, free, competitive and regular elections, alternative sources of information, and most have experienced political alternations. Where alternations have been absent, such as in Jujuy, opposition parties have gained a considerable number of legislative seats and could have won governorship elections on multiple occasions if they were open to coalitions, and the peronist party has been led by various factions. Finally, the military is no longer a pertinent political actor. However, in the three provinces studied here, peronist power holders ensure the victory of the dominant party through legal and illegal means, in what amounts to a competitive authoritarian system.

Political parties are at the heart of politics at both national and subnational levels as well as in their interactions. Due to legislative malapportionment, especially in the federal senate, peripheral provinces have significant weight at the national level and can be cheap seats to win for a national party. At the same time, peripheral provinces rely on the federal government's financial resources for their budgets and to secure their own governing party's hold on power. Due to this relationship between the national and subnational levels, democratic national governments tolerate authoritarian practices in the provinces.

The Argentine party system has become increasingly territorialized since democratization; that is, fragmented and heterogeneous across the country. Electoral competition takes place in different arenas that allow for the distribution of political space to political factions with distinct territorial projection (local, provincial, national). The superposition of these arenas requires that political parties diversify their strategic repertoire, alternating resource investment as well as organizational capacity and support. The constitution of a provincial party (which type of social actors, its degree of cohesion) and the linkage between government and society (clientelism, programmatic) are both salient variables for explaining diverging subnational political trajectories and the development of patterns of violence within these.

The peronists have responded to different subnational settings in building local party structures capable of ensuring electoral success. Initially, the national government state and the figure of Peron were decisive in creating a particular institution and practices. Changes in subnational governance occurred with the death of Peron, economic liberalization, and democratization. The radical neoliberal agenda of president Menem then allowed new actors to play a significant role and provoked a new and differentiated form of governance in peripheral provinces that crystalized during the Kirchner governments. Separating these three historical periods (emergence of peronism, democratization and liberalization 1983-1999, and crystallization 2003-2013) helps us to understand the continuities of authoritarian practices.

The peronist party mainly operates on an informal, vertical basis. Personal networks and clientelism often determine political careers and decision-making is concentrated in the upper spheres of the party hierarchy, rather than in formal instances. The party's finances are informal

and sometimes illegal, including patronage, illegal donations, and appropriation of state resources. The informality of the party results in a lack of transparency and many instances of corruption. In this context, authoritarian practices develop and are tolerated.

Panel Seven: Open Discussion
Contributions focused on the themes, questions, and problems arising from the panel presentations.

- Solving the violence problem seems to require a mobilized civil society and an active state willing to build links of trust and respect with citizens. Different mechanisms work in different cases, depending on local contexts and actors.
- It is not clear what qualifies as success and failure in dealing with violence. For some, this relates to time frame, where long-term results count more than short-term.
- It is not clear what role the national government plays. In some cases it is a fickle actor (Lapegna) and in others outright negative (Rivard Piché) in finding solutions to violence. It may also be the perpetrator of violence in a quest to enforce its own legitimacy (Durazo Herrmann).
- Federal vs. unitary systems do not appear to be especially significant in explaining subnational differences in violence.
- Territory is a central issue, as violence is often the result of competition for territory.
- Clientelism is an important issue, as violent actors are often embedded in networks of power.
- Formal / informal divides are important considerations in what is (often wrongly) perceived as legitimate or illegitimate violence.
- What does sub-nationalism mean? Various factors and levels are at play – transnational, national, local, micro-level – and interact to effect territorially specific iterations of violence. This makes it difficult to generate a unified theory of violence.
- How important is the judiciary?
- What is the importance of party system?
- What are the links between citizenship and violence?
- We need to understand how gender roles relate to themes of culture and identity in violence.
- Multi-disciplinary and mixed method work is necessary to explore these issues. Existing research often concentrates either on structural and institutional determinants or on local level dynamics, but it seems that the strongest approaches combine levels of analysis to underscore interaction among different scales.

Clientelism and Violence in Subnational Latin American and Caribbean Politics

December 13-14, 2013

Carleton University, Ottawa
River Building, Room 2440R

This conference is made possible with the generous support of:

Friday, December 13th

9:30 – 10:00   *Welcome and Introduction*
              Tina Hilgers (Concordia University)

10:00 – 11:30 *Setting the Stage: The Economic and Institutional Context*
              Clientelism and State-Society Relations in Latin America: Assessing the
              Democratic Consolidation Process
              Julián Durazo Herrmann (UQAM)
              Lead questioner: Kent Eaton (UC Santa Cruz)

              The "subnational" and Latin America's violence problem
              Jean Daudelin (Carleton University)
              Lead questioner: Enrique Desmond Arias (George Mason University)

2:00 – 4:00   *Brazil*
              Criminal Violence and Micro-Level Political Orders in Rio de Janeiro and
              Medellin
              Enrique Desmond Arias (George Mason University)
              Lead questioner: Jean Daudelin (Carleton University)

              The Social and Political Embeddedness of Violence: Criminal Factions and
              Militias in Rio
              Robert Gay (Connecticut College)
              Lead questioners: Jorge Barbosa (Observatorio de Favelas and UFRJ) and Gaëlle
              Rivard Piché (Carleton University)

              Homicídios de jovens negros no Brasil e os desafios à construção de uma agenda
              de superação da violência letal
              Raquel Willadino (Observatorio de Favelas) and Jorge Luiz Barbosa
              (Observatorio de Favelas and UFRJ)
              Lead questioner: Robert Gay (Connecticut College)

4:10 – 5:40   *Colombia*
              Subnational Authoritarian Enclaves: The Colombian Experience
              Kent Eaton (UC, Santa Cruz) and Juan Diego Prieto (UC, Santa Cruz)
              Lead questioners: Julián Durazo Herrmann (UQAM) and Iván Darío Ramírez
              Adarve (Corporación Paz y Democracia, Medellín)

              Mafia, poder y territorio: El caso de Medellín, Colombia
              Iván Darío Ramírez Adarve (Corporación Paz y Democracia, Medellín)
              Lead questioner: Juan Diego Prieto (UC Santa Cruz)

Saturday, December 14th

9:00 – 11:00   *Jamaica and El Salvador*
Democracy, Clientelism, Violence in Jamaica
Horace Levy (University of the West Indies, Mona)
Lead questioners: Colin Clarke (Oxford) and Yonique Campbell (Oxford)

Politics, Security and Citizenship in Jamaica: The Class Dimension in Kingston
Colin Clarke (Oxford) and Yonique Campbell (Oxford)
Lead questioner: Horace Levy (University of the West Indies, Mona)

When Maras Make Peace: Insights on Security Sector Governance in El Salvador
Gaëlle Rivard Piché (Carleton University)
Lead questioner: Markus Michael Müller (Freie Universität Berlin)

11:10 – 1:10   *Mexico*
The Clientelist Bases of Insecurity and Police Violence in Democratic Mexico City
Markus Michael Müller (Freie Universität Berlin)
Lead questioner: Victoria Simmons (Carleton University)

Guns and Butter: Social Policy, Neo-Clientelism, and Efforts to Reduce Violence in Mexico City
Laura Macdonald (Carleton University) and Lucy Luccisano (Wilfrid Laurier University)
Lead questioner: Tina Hilgers (Concordia University)

The securitization and humanitarianization of migration in Mexico: A critical view on recent efforts to end violence against migrants in Mexico
Victoria Simmons (Carleton University)
Lead questioner: Lucy Luccisano (Wilfrid Laurier University)

2:40 – 4:10   *Argentina*
Three Shades of Violence: Transgenic Agriculture, Rural Displacement, and Clientelist Provincial Governments in Argentina
Pablo Lapegna (University of Georgia)
Lead questioner: Hugues Fournier (UQAM)

Subnational politics in Argentina: diverging trajectories and transformation opportunities
Hugues Fournier (UQAM)
Lead questioner: Pablo Lapegna (University of Georgia)

4:20 – 5:00   *Closing Discussion*