Netanyahu vs the Generals; an Age-Old Tension
Randy Pinsky
In March 2024, US Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer made a controversial speech regarding the Israel-Hamas war in which he suggested that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had ‘lost his way’, advocating for early elections. This was strongly condemned by Netanyahu as ‘inappropriate’ from a fellow democratic ally, particularly in a time of conflict, however the sentiment was one shared by many in Israel's security establishment.
In his Montreal launch of Netanyahu vs. the Generals: The Battle for Israel’s Future on March 25th at the Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies, Dr. Guy Ziv discussed the history of tension between Israel’s longest-serving prime minister and the Israel Defense Forces.
The “Speech That Sent Shockwaves from Washington to Jerusalem”
In what would become a notorious press conference on Capitol Hill on March 14, Chuck Schumer, the highest ranking Jewish elected official in the US, stated that Netanyahu had “allowed his political survival to take precedence over the best interests of Israel.”
While Schumer covered many topics, ranging from Hamas’ violence to military and strategic decisions and the impact on Palestinian civilians, the media focused almost exclusively on his critique of Israel’s leadership at such a crucial moment. “The Netanyahu coalition no longer fits the needs of Israel after October 7,” Schumer claimed. “The world has changed radically since then, and the Israeli people are being stifled right now by a governing vision that is stuck in the past.”
Reactions
The speech was met with both praise and critique internationally, and immediately condemned by Netanyahu. “It’s inappropriate to go to a sister democracy and try to replace the elected leadership there,” he retorted on CNN’s State of the Union. “That’s something that Israel, the Israeli public does on its own.”
Michael Herzog, Israel’s Ambassador to the United States, concurred that the speech was “unhelpful” and “counterproductive.”
Schumer himself expressed concern at the accusations of treason. Reflecting on his name which comes from the Hebrew word “Shomer” or “Guardian,” that he has been a long-time - yet critical friend of Israel. In an interview with The New York Times, he underscored how the purpose of his speech was to reinforce that one could support the country but not the leadership (a clarification Netanyahu rejected).
In fact, this has been a perspective that has long been held by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), and one which only intensified in the wake of the October 7th crisis.
The End of an Era
Netanyahu’s entire political career has been premised on a carefully cultivated image as Israel’s ‘Mr. Security,” said Ziv, Associate Professor of Foreign Policy and Global Security at the American University of Washington. A tough negotiator known for his firm-handed policies, Netanyahu prides himself on being the longest consecutive serving leader of Israel, and best positioned to maintain its safety.
Everything changed on October 7, 2023.
“This was a pivotal year,” shared Ziv. “The year he lost his image.”
How could such a well-orchestrated massacre occur undetected? How were Hamas terrorists able to scale over security fences to wreck havoc on unsuspecting kibbutzniks and innocent participants at a music festival? The country’s focus on the numerous elections and political parties’ infighting may have contributed to a momentary lapse of focus, an internal divisiveness the terrorist group opportunized upon, a distraction with disastrous consequences. Netanyahu’s refusal to acknowledge responsibility for it, and his approach to handling the conflict has only fostered more criticism.
Long-Time Animosity
Rather than being an isolated opinion, Schumer’s assessment of Netanyahu’s leadership “was a conclusion that the Israeli national security community had reached a long time ago,” explained Ziv. In fact, former Israeli generals and intelligence chiefs have long been his most outspoken and public critics.
The mutual animosity between Netanyahu and the security establishment started since he first took power in 1996. Many viewed him more as a ‘man of rhetoric’, more speeches over action, and “exercising poor judgment” when he did act. One example was in 2016 when an IDF soldier was reprimanded for killing a Palestinian terrorist who had already been subdued. Rather than support the IDF’s arrest for the misdemeanor, he attempted to undermine its authority and argued for a pardon. Another was opening the religiously contested tunnel under the Old City of Jerusalem to tourists, predictably provoking outrage (more below).
Netanyahu’s image as Mr. Security subsequently, has never been accepted as such by the military. In fact, “many [actually] see him as a security liability” and “as a politician who routinely places his personal and political interests ahead of national security concerns.”
As a result, Netanyahu has long “exclud[ed] the IDF generals from the decision-making process, associating them with the political left and seeing them as potential rivals,” said Ziv.
The Clashes Begin
The year 1996 would be forever etched in the minds of Israelis - three years after the historical Oslo Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a religious Jewish nationalist who opposed his land-for-peace deals with the Palestinians.
As opposition leader, Netanyahu had participated in demonstrations against Rabin’s efforts. Convinced that Rabin's diplomatic moves for peace were misguided, he ran on a platform in which he promised to “stall and if possible, even reverse his predecessor’s concessions.” His diametrically different approach was particularly painful for those in the military who had worked closely with Rabin, seeing his action as an affront to his legacy.
And the feeling was mutual. As observed by a former senior adviser to the prime minister, “Bibi thought the generals were all ‘Rabin's men’. He didn’t trust them.”
Netanyahu vs. the People’s Army
It is revealing to note that in routine polls, the IDF is trusted far more by the Israeli public than the government. It has long been viewed with honor and respect, with leaders such as Moshe Dayan and Rabin being viewed in almost mythological terms, with heroic and legendary status often associated with the 1967 Six-Day War.
Additionally, “unlike in most Western democracies, where the military is usually considered more hawkish than the civilian leadership, in Netanyahu’s Israel, it’s usually been the other way around.” In fact, the IDF has been behind many of the peace efforts in Israel’s history, even when it was contested by the ruling party. Examples include having submitted proposals for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip even before the conclusion of the Six-Day War, and pushing for peace talks with the Palestinian Liberation Organization during the intifadas of the 1990s and 2000s.
What Constitutes Security?
The most critical disconnect between Netanyahu and the security establishment is Bibi’s firm assertion to abide by a ‘living by the sword' mentality, in which he believes military prowess must be continually demonstrated in order to act as a deterrence. Alternatively, the IDF maintains that Israel “derives its strength from arms, but also…from diplomacy and peacemaking, when possible” believing that such negotiations are even more essential to long-term stability in the region.
In fact, some generals in the IDF are leery about Netanyahu’s politics, believing he “has paid lip service to the idea of peace while in effect mothballing any steps toward resolving the conflict.”
The inconsistency of the PM’s messaging has also confused many he works with as “they ha[ve] no idea what his policy really is.” As stated by a member of the IDF, “One day, he’s for a Palestinian state, the next day he’s against it. He says something in English to the Americans, and contradicts himself a week later in Hebrew.”
Who to Blame…
Netanyahu’s main political contenders have been popular ex-generals such as former IDF Chief of Staff Ehud Barak who ousted him in 1999.
Upon returning to power in 2009, he would seek to limit their ability to challenge him in the future. One of his first acts was to extend the one-year 'cooling off period’ after military service before entering politics to a mandatory three years; an effort to reduce the public relevance of military generals’ public relevance and “dull their sheen,” explained Ziv.
Netanyahu also gradually replaced former generals in politics with political allies who were “less independent, less charismatic, and if possible, closer to his worldview.”
Problems Develop
With his confidence is self-cultivated image as Mr. Security, throughout his career, Netanyahu has limited consulting with the heads of the IDF on decisions; a perspective denounced by the Shin Bet and Mossad intelligence agencies.
This was glaringly apparent in the unilateral decision to open the religiously contentious tunnel under the Old City of Jerusalem to tourists in 1996 which was made without consulting the military (“we heard about it from the news”), predictably sparking a violent outburst.
Rather than admit culpability, members of Israel's intelligence agencies were astounded to see news stories and investigations, insinuating complicity of the security chiefs.
Ami Ayalon, a former admiral of the Shin Bet. “Bibi was trying to shift the blame [on]to us. In the culture of the military, taking responsibility for your decisions is a core value. A commandeer can’t make a mistake and then try to pin it on his soldiers. But that’s essentially what Bibi was trying to do.”
Lack of Trust, Internal Problems
In a time of war, internal conflict can be just as dangerous as external threats. Families devastated by the loss of community members taken hostage or as military casualties condemn how the divisiveness due to controversial judicial reforms and problematic decisions, might have contributed to a distracted and thereby, susceptible nation. This was compounded by Netanyahu’s almost arrogant dismissal of input from the security establishment, resulting in a ripple effect of palpable tension.
How Israel will handle this challenge will be up to the Israelis themselves however, not an external ally.
