The Next Abraham Accords? Normalization of Israeli-Saudi Relations
By Randy Pinsky
Past diplomatic relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors had always been predicated on military reconciliations and often contingent on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - until the Abraham Accords of 2020. This historical peace brokered between Israel, Morocco, Bahrein, UAE and Sudan was based more on shared security and economic interests.
Negotiations were already in place for an agreement with Saudi Arabia, a pivotal player central to addressing Arab-Israeli tensions in a volatile region…and then October 7th happened. What is the current status of normalization and what implication does this bear for the Middle East?
Momentum in the Region
After the success of the Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab neighbors mediated by the United States, there was much hope for a similar deal made with Saudi Arabia. Beyond the numerous economic and security considerations, there were also opportunities for intelligence cooperation, and a critical united front against Iran and its allies. As a highly influential player in the Middle East, normalizing relations would be a game changer in geopolitics.
“A historic peace agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia…could greatly advance an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict,” said an Israeli official at a UN General Assembly meeting in New York right before the attacks of October 7th. Such a strategic partnership would be a shared buffer against Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’, and help infuse stability in the region.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud (MBS) echoed that such a deal would be “the most significant historic agreement since the end of the Cold War.” Indeed, relations with Saudi Arabia had been critical for the US against the Soviet Union and Arab Nationalist movement during that tense period.
For Israel, this was valuable as “it represent[ed] a guarantee of Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist [and] acknowledgement of its historical narrative.” Such a normalization would also be key for additional collaborations and thus was a priority for both the Netanyahu and Biden administrations.
Negotiations at a Standstill
The Hamas attacks on October 7th froze all negotiations in its tracks, derailing discussions.
While Saudi officials and even royalty were noteworthy in their condemnation of the massacre, they also were highly critical of Israel's retaliatory actions. In particular, they opposed Israel’s entering of Rafah (what would prove to be a Hamas stronghold) and continually pushed for a ceasefire.
Far from being disconnected to the deal, global leaders including Biden have speculated that the attacks were orchestrated with the intent to thwart a finalization of the agreement. Normalization with Saudi Arabia would greatly strengthen the allies in the region and weaken Iran and its proxy Hamas.
So What Now
In spite of the conflict, Israel, the US and Saudi Arabia have agreed to resume discussions and restart the momentum of the Abraham Accords.
Former US President Joe Biden recognized the significance of such a proposed series of negotiations, viewing it as “a potential landmark achievement in his foreign policy agenda.” In fact, it was at the top of his list of political commitments when he first entered the White House back in 2021.
As noted by The Arab Center research organization, “This alliance, primarily focused on economic and security cooperation, is intended to fill the void left by the partial American disengagement from the region, counterbalance China’s growing influence, and confront Iran.”
Why Saudi Arabia?
Aside from being a highly influential actor in both the Arab and Muslim world, normalization with Saudi Arabia was strategic on numerous levels. One was the prospects for stability in the region, due to shared animosity against Iran. Its influence could also inspire subsequent inroads with other Arab actors, leading to a lessening of tension in the region.
Second is the enormous economic and trade prospects. Saudi views Israeli ingenuity as being key for its Vision 2030 economic diversification and social reform program.
Another key motivator for the US was to contain China's growing influence in the Middle East, a critical rival. Beijing has made strategic partnerships with Syria and Kuwait, and “helped broker a Saudi-Iran détente after decades of enmity between Riyadh and Tehran.” Saudi Arabia was China’s top crude oil supplier in 2022, with China its biggest purchaser.
The US concerns with Chinese rapprochement in the Middle East entail its non-intervention policy in domestic affairs, whereas it had expressed concerns regarding Saudi’s spotty human rights record such as the high-profile murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. China is also seen as a dangerous player in the field of nuclear power, as their assistance in setting up plants do not have the same restrictions and guidelines on proliferation as upheld by Washington.
The Abraham Accords; Slow But Important Progress
Michal Cotler-Wunsh, Israel's Special Envoy for Combating Antisemitism mentioned the Abraham Accords in her September 2024 speech at Montreal’s Shaar Hashamayim synagogue. Whereas much of the Arab world has adhered to the infamous three no’s (no peace with Israel, no negotiation, no recognition), the Accords flipped the script. In doing so, Cotler-Wunsh identified a basic sticking point impeding normalized relations in the region; peace cannot be possible without first basic acknowledgement.
Rapprochements are thus a critical precondition for normalization, followed by diplomacy and economic relations. In the process of defining the terms of negotiations, it is hoped that mutual trust and shared interests will ultimately contribute to peaceful relations.
The common denominator of many previous stalled negotiations with Arab partners has been the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Abraham Accords thus “marked a turning point in the geopolitics of the Middle East” as they demonstrated “that the resolution of the Palestinian question is no longer a sine qua non condition for the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world.”
Except That…
However this would not be so with proposed political dealings with Saudi Arabia. Since the start of the negotiations, the Saudi partners have reinforced the requirement of addressing the Palestinian issue in the deal. In fact, conditions for normalization included the withdrawal to the ‘67 borders, freezing of settlement building and meaningful progress towards a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem; details expressed in the largely Saudi-led 2002 Arab Peace Initiative
Although they were perceived as problematic and extreme by the Netanyahu government, arbitration and debates ensued as many believed “an agreement with Saudi Arabia [wa]s the last chance to leverage meaningful progresstowards a two-state solution.”
Progress in this regard was dashed with the October attacks. It had become apparent that without a willing partner for peace, a two-state solution would be unfeasible. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 had not led to any advancement in creating a thriving democratic Palestinian state but rather a launching pad for Hamas armaments.
It is worthy to note that just a month prior to the attacks, these and other sticking points seemed somehow surmountable. There is bittersweet irony that in September 2023, Israel’s Foreign Minister Eli Cohen announced to Israel’s Army Radio that they expected a deal to be reached soon. “The gaps can be bridged,” he said. “I think there is certainly a likelihood that, in the first quarter of 2024…we will be able to be at an appointment where the details are finalized.”
What Would a Deal Entail?
Israeli-Saudi normalization would be in exchange for a US defense pact and security guarantees, a civilian nuclear program, and progress towards a Palestinian state. Such an agreement was considered a top priority for the US and of “national security interest,” particularly after Saudi Arabia and Iran had res-established diplomatic ties after years of animosity.
Prior to the conflict, tangible steps had been taken. Saudi sent its first ambassador to meet the Palestinian Authority, and Israel dispatched an official delegation to Riyadh for a UN conference; significant diplomatic firsts. According to the United States Institute of Peace, for their part, “In seeking to mitigate potential losses and maximize potential gains, the Palestinians reportedly pledged to not publicly criticize any potential deal.”
Can It Be Redeemed?
The attacks of October 7 and resulting conflict have drastically altered the balance of power in the region with changing allies and allegiances. “The process of normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world, accelerated by the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, is its main victim.”
Yet hope is not lost on a deal with Saudi Arabia. Top US Middle East Envoy, Brett McGurk has expressed his belief “that a solution to the Gaza crisis is inextricably linked to a Saudi-Israeli normalization deal.”
In speaking at the 2024 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Saudi ambassador to the United States Princess Reema bint Bandar Al Saud, expressed the aim for integration rather than solely normalization with Israel. In fact, she advocated for a more comprehensive approach “in which prosperity and collaboration transcend the mere coexistence of neighboring states…[of] a thriving Israel alongside a thriving Palestine.”
Only time will tell.
