Multiple international environmental agreements

Because many environmental issues are global in nature, countries have increasingly recognized the importance of worldwide cooperation to develop common solutions to the problem. This has led to the ratification of numerous International Environmental Agreements such as the Montreal Protocol (1987), the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015). Despite signatories’ pledges to curb emissions, the above agreements appear ineffective in slowing down global warming due to free-rider incentives and the lack of a supranational authority to enforce compliance. In the last decade, Multiple International Environmental Agreements emerged as an alternative approach to address global environmental issues. In this work, PhD candidate Olha Hnatyshyn develops a model of MIEAs within a class of a two-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game with negative externalities in a partition function form, with quadratic benefits and environmental damage functions and simultaneous choice of emissions. Within this framework, multiple coalition formation game leads to better results in emissions reduction and greater benefits from cooperation.