Laura Tomlinson Makin | Intention and the Meaning of 'Ought' | Philosophy Speaker Series

Abstract: In this talk, I'll argue that the standard semantics for 'ought,' according to which 'ought' claims are composed of an ought-operator and a proposition, is wrong. I begin by showing that the standard semantics is morally tendentious, in precisely the way ethicists have suspected it to be: it rules out substantive alternatives to consequentialism. That argument relies on the fact that intentional actions and states of affairs distribute differently over entailment; I consequently examine the closure rules for 'intention' and argue that the contours of an inheritance rule for intention solve a number of the problems faced by the unrestricted inheritance rule for 'ought' are validated by the standard semantics. Using the similarities between 'intention' and 'ought,' I offer a constraint on future modifications of the standard semantics for 'ought,' and argue that no account, according to which the prejacent of an 'ought' claim can only be a proposition, can meet this constraint.

Laura Tomlinson Makin is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Colgate University. Her main areas of research include ethics, metaethics, and philosophy of action.