Jessica Gelber | Aristotle on Necessity “From an Assumption” | Philosophy Speaker Series

Abstract: Aristotle thinks there are different ways to be necessary. One way, often called “hypothetical” or “conditional” necessity, is associated with his commitment to teleology: something is hypothetically necessary when it is needed for some end or purpose to be achieved. It is standard orthodoxy that Aristotle’s main discussions of hypothetical necessity occur in two passages (Parts of Animals I.1 and Physics II.9), where he speaks of a kind of necessity he qualifies as “from an assumption” (ex hupotheseôs). I am going to argue that this is not correct, and will propose an alternative way of understanding what this qualification means. Unlike the orthodox interpretation, my proposal renders Aristotle’s canonical discussions of this kind of necessity consistent with his practices, and makes the criticism raised in those passages compelling even to someone who does not share Aristotle’s belief in teleology.