PhD Oral Exam - Olha Hnatyshyn, Economics

When studying for a doctoral degree (PhD), candidates submit a thesis that provides a critical review of the current state of knowledge of the thesis subject as well as the student’s own contributions to the subject. The distinguishing criterion of doctoral graduate research is a significant and original contribution to knowledge.

Once accepted, the candidate presents the thesis orally. This oral exam is open to the public.

Abstract

This thesis addresses the multifaceted challenges of global climate cooperation through a comprehensive analysis of international environmental agreements. It examines three critical dimensions: the formation and stability of multiple international environmental agreements, the influence of ethical considerations and public pressure on climate governance, and the role of leadership in fostering cooperation on net emissions. These interrelated themes offer innovative perspectives on the stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements.

The first essay explores the existence and stability of multiple international environmental agreements within a two-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game framework. Utilizing a partition function form with negative externalities, the model enables the formation of multiple coalitions. The welfare of each country depends on both the coalition structure and the size of the coalition it joins. This approach captures externalities across coalitions and allows for a refined analysis of coalition dynamics. The findings reveal a unique stable coalition structure characterized by multiple coalitions, achieving greater pollution reduction and higher welfare gains compared to a single coalition.

The second essay investigates the role of ethical incentives in reducing emissions and enhancing the stability of climate agreements. By extending a classic model to include an ethical damage function derived from moral considerations, the study explores how integrating ethical imperatives into decision-making affects emissions, cooperation, and welfare under two game-theoretic settings: simultaneous coalition formation and leadership game. Key findings reveal that incorporating ethical incentives leads to significant reductions in emissions and increased welfare gains, particularly when all countries align economic goals with ethical imperatives. In simultaneous coalition formation, ethical considerations enhance welfare gains even without improving cooperation levels. Under leadership, widespread adoption of ethical imperatives results in substantial emissions reductions, greater cooperation, and improved benefits from cooperation. The study underscores the critical role of global public pressure in fostering stricter environmental standards.

The third essay examines the role of leadership in promoting cooperation on net emissions through a time-inconsistent three-stage non-cooperative leadership game. The analysis finds that a unique coalition of four members remains stable across varying levels of abatement and environmental damage costs. Larger coalitions become possible with costless abatement, enabling countries to make substantial investments in reducing environmental damage while maintaining economic growth. High abatement costs, however, force countries to prioritize emissions reductions over mitigation efforts, diminishing economic benefits and overall gains. While this generally decreases coalition size, it seldom reduces membership below three countries.

Together, these essays contribute to the study of international environmental agreements by offering novel insights into coalition formation, leadership dynamics, and the integration of ethical incentives in addressing the pressing global crisis of climate change and promoting global cooperation for environmental sustainability.