This article was originally published in The National Interest
As America’s most important Asian ally, Japan must improve its anti-espionage capabilities.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has entered its third year. The failure to adequately respond and prepare for what is now a prolonged war has come at great cost. Intelligence reports from a multitude of sources (U.S., UK, EU, Ukrainian, other) clearly showed a certain degree of awareness of the Russian buildup. However, preventive measures came too late, with Ukraine only approving a state of emergency one day before the Russian invasion. Failure to purge Ukrainian army commanders sympathetic to Moscow, which resulted in the loss of much of Southeastern Ukraine, was only offset by the Russian military’s lack of preparedness for resistance. A similar challenge confronts Taiwan’s penetration by Chinese agents and sympathizers.
Japan is the United States’ principal Asian ally, commanding a powerful naval deterrent and counter-balance to Chinese aggression. Unfortunately, Japan has a notorious reputation as a “spy heaven.” The government cannot safeguard defense secrets and thus presides over an environment where foreign agents operate relatively free from discovery and punishment. This distinction stems from the absence of a stringent “counter-espionage law,” while existing law enforcement agencies are reluctant to impose stringent controls and surveillance. During the Cold War, this lax disposition against Soviet Union interference led to repeated and avertible penetrations, including cases such as the 1971 Kononov, 1981 Kozlov, and 1983 Levchenko Incidents.
Japan’s recent revisions to its anti-espionage laws have proven a weak instrument for Tokyo’s security agencies, and a major overhaul is required. In 2013, the exposure of classified material in the 2005 Savelyev Affair and the 2007 Aegis Leak, led Washington to pressure then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to railroad through the Specially Designated Secrecy Law (SDS). At the time, the SDS Law constituted a noticeable improvement and bolstered the two pre-existing domestic secrecy laws and two U.S.-Japan bilateral secrecy agreements.
However, the SDS Law has two significant flaws. First, it prescribes a maximum sentence of only ten years of imprisonment and a fine of 10 million yen (approximately $70,000), if convicted. This is considerably more lax when compared to the U.S. Espionage Act and other anti-spying laws, which impose a maximum penalty of life imprisonment or even the death penalty following conviction. Critics have predictably questioned if the law’s penal provisions will act as a substantial deterrent against spying.
Second, the law only stipulates punishment for those who have stolen or disclosed material classified explicitly as “Specially Designated Secrets.” Remarkably, those who collect or leak material of sensitive nature without that classification, or before information was so designated, cannot be convicted under the SDS Law. Accessing less classified personal data intended to identify and extort Japanese citizens to betray intelligence material, or theft of related industrial design data, would be subject to the weaker legislative regime.
Consequently, recent espionage incidents have exposed these flaws resulting from the law’s limited coverage, and demonstrably weak deterrent resulting from its inadequate penal provisions against espionage. Case in point, in 2020, a former employee of SoftBank telecoms and internet company leaked manuals for mobile phone base stations and related communications facilities to a Russian diplomat. Even with blatant evidence that the former employee had willingly conducted espionage on behalf of a foreign state, he was only charged with violating the Unfair Competition Prevention Act and handed a two-year prison sentence, and not the SDS Law due to its restrictive provisions.
While the leaked information was allegedly of “low confidentiality,” serious concerns were rightfully raised during a Diet session, some of whose members discussed expanding the coverage of secrecy laws to include violations in the private sector to protect national interests against foreign espionage.
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Just one year later, blueprints of prototype Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) weaponry were accidentally given to Chinese companies by Sumitomo Heavy Industries; the company only received a warning for violating the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act.
Foreign infiltration is not slowing down. In 2023, Japan suffered a devastating cyberattack launched by a Russian ransomware group, which lead to the shutdown of its largest port. The NIST (National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity), which is responsible for overseeing Japanese cybersecurity policies, was itself infiltrated for months by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
The continuing foreign intelligence operations in Japan and the lack of substantial consequences exemplifies the serious need for reform and the creation of an encompassing legal structure for safeguarding Japanese state secrets. This is further compounded by the fact that there is little counterintelligence and security training within Japanese public institutions and private corporations that handle state secrets.
Japan’s dismal track-record of responding to security and intelligence threats, undermines its reliability as an ally. Japanese aerial and anti-submarine patrols, missile interception capabilities over Japan and in the Ryukyu Islands, anti-ship missile radar frequencies and jamming counter-measures, and convoy resupply schedules to Taiwan, could all be compromised, and may in turn alert China to anticipate U.S. operations conducted jointly with Japan.
Broken security precautions have historically contributed to decisive military defeats, such as at the Battle of Midway in 1942, and crippled friendly espionage networks. Multiple historical examples, such as the John Walker spy case or the “Cambridge Five” spy ring have demonstrated the severe damage foreign agents can inflict on exposed government and military operations.
The continued foreign intelligence operations in Japan illustrates the immediate need for a more comprehensive legal structure to safeguard Japanese state secrets. The existing anti-espionage laws are impotent and complicit in facilitating a lax environment for subversive elements to operate freely.
Japan needs an encompassing “anti-espionage law” similar to the standard adopted in other G7 nations, to properly crack down on foreign operatives, and its counterespionage capabilities must be increased. As a CSIS report recently asserted, should Tokyo’s involvement be extended to the Five Eyes, it must assure its allies that Japan’s addition “will not expand risks by implementing a tougher legal framework with stricter protections and a robust counter-intelligence setup.”
Japan in its current state is a potentially disruptive backdoor against U.S. efforts in the event of a Taiwan invasion. Strengthening Japanese counterespionage capabilities will be critical to the U.S.-Japan alliance and furthering QUAD collaboration. Intelligence vulnerabilities in Japan are not solely a Japanese problem, but an alliance problem that undermines the security of the United States as well as the wider Indo-Pacific region.
About the Authors: Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill, Ulysse Oliveira Baptista, and Maximilien Hachiya
Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is an associate professor of international relations at Concordia University and the author of Militarization and War (2007) and Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer of the 3rd Field Engineer Regiment from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11. He tweets at @Ju_Sp_Churchill.
Ulysse Oliveira Baptista is a Political Science student at Concordia University Montréal. He is an associate researcher at the Canadian Center for Strategic Studies.
Maximilien Hachiya is a War Studies scholar at King’s College London.
