Seminars
Concordia regularly hosts research seminars showcasing cutting-edge work by economists and scholars from around the world.
These events are open to faculty, graduate students, and researchers from Concordia and universities across Montreal and beyond, fostering a vibrant and collaborative research community.
The information on this page is updated every Monday.
Please verify the information prior to coming on campus for an event, as times or location might change.
Upcoming seminars
Friday, November 14, 2025, 9:15 a.m.
Virtual Seminars in Information Economics and Experiments
Takuro Yamashita (The University of Osaka)
Information Design for Information-Averse Agent (joint with Shuguang Zhu)
Location: virtual, please contact one of the meeting co-hosts to register
Meeting co-hosts: Ming Li and Huan Xie
A principal seeks to maximize an agent’s material welfare by providing information. However, the agent’s preference is shaped not only by his material payoff but also by a psychological (belief-dependent) cost, which makes him averse to receiving excessively negative information. We provide conditions under which the optimal information structure is positively or negatively skewed, reflecting the trade-off between informativeness and psychological burden.
Friday, November 14, 2025, 10 a.m.
Economics Graduate Seminar Series
- Oyu-Erdene Buyandelger: Understanding the Mechanism of the Future to Discover Project
- Xiao Zhang: Delegation and endowment heterogeneity in a threshold public goods game
Location: H-1145, 1455 De Maisonneuve W, 11th floor
Meeting host: Christian Sigouin
Friday, November 14, 2025, 3:30 p.m.
Montreal Econometrics seminar (joint CIREQ and QUANTACT)
Christian Gourieroux (University of Toronto and CREST)
Forecast relative error decomposition (with Quinlan Lee)
Location: H-1145, 1455 De Maisonneuve W, 11th floor
Meeting host: Prosper Dovonon
Friday, November 21, 2025, 10:30 a.m.
Concordia Economics seminar
Yishu Zeng (York University)
Decentralized Persuasion (joint with I. Arieli and R. Gradwohl)
Location: H-1145, 1455 De Maisonneuve W, 11th floor
Meeting host: Ming Li
Information is often distributed across multiple senders. This paper explores the extent to which senders with a common utility function but independent and imperfect information can collaboratively persuade a receiver. We suppose that the senders' combined information (almost) fully reveals the true state, and compare these senders' attainable utility to the maximum achievable by a single, fully informed sender. We show that decentralized senders cannot generally attain this maximum, except in cases where fully revealing a state is optimal. On the positive side, we show that they can guarantee a constant fraction of this maximum, and that the maximum itself can be obtained if senders have access to a public randomization device.
Friday, November 28, 2025, 10 a.m.
Economics Graduate Seminar Series
- Zahraa Arkahdan: The Impact of University Quality on Earnings
- Bidhan Chandra Shaha: Impact of Family Dynamics on Children Skill Development
Location: H-1145, 1455 De Maisonneuve W, 11th floor
Meeting host: Christian Sigouin
Friday, December 5, 2025, 9:15 a.m.
Virtual Seminars in Information Economics and Experiments
David Rahman (University of Minnesota)
Title TBA
Location: virtual, please contact one of the meeting co-hosts to register
Meeting co-hosts: Ming Li and Huan Xie
